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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates the link between political sophistication and electoral volatility. Showing that 
there is disagreement in the literature on whether switching party preferences is related to low or high 
levels of political sophistication, it is then argued that the effect of sophistication on vote switching 
might differ depending on when switching is measured. The effect of timing on volatility is 
investigated by means of the Short-term panel of the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Study.  
Results indicate that timing indeed matters, while sophistication increases the probability of switching 
parties before the campaign, the effect of political sophistication becomes more negative as Election 
Day draws near. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Electoral volatility is a central concept in political research and has even been called “one of the most 
important areas of comparative political research”.1 Despite a rich literature investigating the causes 
and consequences of volatility, the link between political sophistication and electoral volatility is still 
debated. The ‘floating voter’ hypothesis, launched by the pioneers of voter studies at Columbia 
University2, links volatility to a lack of information and little interest in politics. A number of scholars 
countered this one-sided view of volatile voters by pointing out that different types of volatile voters 
could be thought of. These scholars argued that volatile voters could be highly politically sophisticated 
as well. 3 The apparent simultaneous rise in educational levels and information sources available for 
voters on the one hand and the increase in volatility on the other hand, have led Russell Dalton4 to 
question the rather pessimistic image of unsophisticated volatile voters. He argues that the electorate 
has fundamentally changed over the past decades and that by now we could observe that changes in 
party preferences are quite pronounced among the higher educated and voters who are highly 
interested in politics. 
 
A large group of scholars has already tried to disentangle the link between political sophistication and 
vote switching and different approaches have been taken to do so.5 The fact that this topic has received 
wide scholarly attention is not surprising; whether it is the high or the low politically sophisticated 
who are most prone to change parties is at the heart of democratic theory. As Berelson and his 
colleagues6 have pointed out, given that volatile voters hold the balance of power, vote switchers are 
preferably high politically sophisticated. 
 
What has been somewhat neglected in the literature, however, is the difference between volatility from 
one election to another and within-campaign volatility. While the first scholars investigating volatility 
–partly due to the data at hand− focused on campaign-volatility only, a number of scholars 
consequently assume that the factors found to be related to switching vote intentions in an election 
campaign are also determinants of switching parties from one election to another.7 When campaign- 
and inter-election volatility is distinguished between, some essential differences between both 
phenomena do show up. Lachat, for example, who is one of the few scholars explicitly distinguishing 
between these two types of volatility, indicates different trends. In the long term, Lachat finds 
campaign volatility to be increasing, but he does not observe a similar pattern for inter-election 
volatility. This contrast leads Lachat to conclude that inter-election volatility signifies realignment, 
while campaign-volatility can be considered an indicator of over-time changes in the vote choice 
process.8 
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Even though inter-election and campaign-volatility are only rarely distinguished between, it is argued 
in this paper that it might be essential to do so. This is especially true because most of what we know 
on volatile voters is based on research investigating campaign-volatility only. Previous research has 
indeed suggested that when strictly separating changes within an election campaign from changes in-
between elections, the effect of political sophistication on electoral volatility is in opposite directions. 
In the Belgian multiparty context, political sophistication has been found to increase the probability 
for inter-election switching, but to decrease the probability of a switch during the campaign period.9 
As such, these findings suggest that it is essential to take both types of switching and the aspect of 
timing into account when investigating the link between political sophistication and volatility. 
 
In this paper, this gap in the current literature is addressed by a specific focus on the difference 
between campaign volatility and inter-election switching in the German context. In a first step, it is 
investigated whether, as was previously found for Belgium, the link between political sophistication 
and volatility differs for both types of volatility. In a second step, this paper seeks to gain insights into 
the mechanisms of potential differences. Are differences inherent to differences between campaign- 
and non-campaign periods, or are differences merely an artefact of time and the fact that as the 
campaign unfolds, Election Day draws near? 
 
These questions are investigated through an analysis on vote switching by respondents in the Short-
term panel of the German Longitudinal Election Study. 10 Methodologically, multilevel event history 
analysis techniques are used, which allow investigating vote (intention) switching over time. The 
focus is on vote switching in the run-up to the German 2009 elections, as such the spotlight is on 
volatility in a multiparty context that has previously found to be affected by a trend of dealignment 
and in which a considerable degree of instability has been reported.11 
 
The paper starts with an overview of the literature on the link between political sophistication and 
electoral volatility. Within the literature section there is specific attention for differences between 
campaign-volatility and inter-election volatility and the aspect of timing. Next comes the description 
of the data and the method chosen. Subsequently, the results are presented and interpreted and the 
paper ends with a discussion on the implications of the findings and limitations of the current study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Electoral volatility driven by political sophistication? 
Originally hinted at in the 1970s12, it is by now considered an established fact that political behaviour 
and voting more specifically are becoming increasingly unstable.13 To some extent, electoral volatility 
is deemed essential. If voters switch parties, this implies that there can be real competition between 
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parties. Additionally, if voters are to hold governing parties accountable, they should be open to 
change parties from one election to another.14  The increase of volatility has also led to concerns, 
however. Effective representation and governability are thought to be at risk in a context of extreme 
instability.15 
 
Even before scholars noticed an increase of volatility, the pioneers of voting behaviour research 
already investigated the phenomenon of volatility. The findings on campaign switching presented in 
their studies led them to a rather pessimistic conclusion: “Stability in vote is characteristic of those 
interested in politics and instability of those not particularly interested”.16 The implication of this 
finding is that, contrary to the Downsian idea of rational voting, it is the least interested in politics who 
switch votes most during an election campaign. Consequently, alterations in election results and in 
government seem to be driven by changes among the least interested part of the electorate. While from 
an idealistic perspective on democracy some flexibility within the system is considered essential, this 
flexibility should be introduced preferably by sophisticated voters. The contradiction between the 
findings of Berelson and his colleagues and an ideal-type democracy has therefore been labelled the 
‘Berelson paradox’.17 
 
Empirical evidence hinting at the fact that it is the less informed and less involved voters that hold the 
balance of power further accumulates. Both in the U.S. and in a European context, scholars have 
indicated that partisans are significantly more informed about and interested in politics. 18  Those 
without a strong identification with a particular party, by contrast, who are also more prone to change 
preferences, are less informed about and less involved in politics. 
 
A more optimistic account on volatile voters has been put forward by Russell Dalton.19 He asserts that 
current electorates can no longer be compared to the voters surveyed by the Columbia school scholars. 
In the 1950s voters were in general less educated and they had access to much less information 
compared to present-day voters. Voters remedied this lack of information by developing long-term 
attachments to political parties based on social characteristics or partisanship. 20 A process of cognitive 
mobilization, however, with rising levels of education and sources for political mobilization 
multiplied, has armed voters to choose parties independently. As a result, habitual party loyalties have 
become redundant for these voters. With partisanship weakened across western industrialized 
countries, the potential for switching party preferences has increased considerably. According to the 
process described by Dalton, the group of apartisans –and therefore also the group most likely to 
change preferences− is increasingly characterized by high levels of political information and 
involvement in politics.21 
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The literature does contain more nuance than the mere opposition between scholars arguing that 
political sophistication decreases volatility on the one and scholars pointing out that sophistication 
increases the probability of switching parties on the other hand. As such, a number of publications 
empirically indicate that the relation between political sophistication and the probability of campaign-
switching is curvilinear. While the least sophisticated voters are not likely to be exposed to political 
information and consequently not likely to change preferences, the most sophisticated voters have 
well-developed political attitudes, rendering them resistant to change. As a consequence, according to 
these authors, it is the middle sophisticated voters who are most likely to switch parties.22  The 
arguments on which this line of thought is based are grounded in the literature on information 
processing23 and are therefore suited best for understanding campaign volatility. Nevertheless, scholars 
assume that the same curvilinear pattern is likely to be found for inter-election switching as well.24  
 
2.2. Campaign volatility versus inter-election volatility 
 
The relation between low levels of interest in politics and party preference switching established by 
Berelson and his colleagues, was originally one found for campaign switchers only. On the question 
whether this finding could be generalized to inter-election switching as well, they were much more 
hesitant.25 The issue of comparability between campaign switching and inter-election volatility has 
remained a point of debate ever since. While there is agreement that one should distinguish between 
both concepts because they are inherently different, the same mechanisms are usually assumed to be 
related to both types of volatility. 26  One reason for this continued assumption is rooted in data 
constrains. While panel-data on single election campaigns are abundantly available, data following the 
same voters for longer periods of time and covering several elections are scarce. This then leads to a 
reliance on recall-data for investigating switching parties from one election to another, which is 
generally considered an imperfect measure.27 
 
As a consequence of these data constrains, only a limited number of publications explicitly 
distinguishes between campaign and inter-election volatility. Given a reliance on findings based on 
campaign volatility, when different patterns between campaign volatility on the one hand and inter-
election volatility on the other hand are found, these contrasts tend to be interpreted as surprising.28 
 
The argument put forward in this paper is that when investigating the link between political 
sophistication and volatility, finding differences for campaign volatility and inter-election volatility 
respectively should not be considered surprising. This is all the more true if one focuses on differences 
in the timing of switching and explicitly differentiates switching before the election campaign and 
campaign switching. 29 Such a strict division implies that inter-election switching refers to switching to 
another party before the subsequent election campaign takes off. Campaign-switching then refers to 
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switching to another party than the party one has voted for in the previous election during the 
subsequent election campaign. A number of arguments can be thought of to be causing differences. 
 
First, previous research in the field of political communication has indicated that political experts and 
political novices respond differently to the information they are exposed to in the media. In research 
on priming, for example, hypotheses are formulated that remind us of the ‘floating voter hypothesis’ 
of Berelson and his colleagues.30  Scholars in this field expect and find evidence indicating that 
political novices are to a larger extent influenced by media messages compared to politically 
sophisticated citizens. 31  For political campaigns more specifically, Zaller has indicated that low 
informed voters are most responsive to election-specific influences. 32  Well informed voters, by 
contrast, have well developed political attitudes and quite often a strong identification with a particular 
party. As a consequence, these citizens look at the campaign with a partisan lens and campaign 
messages only have a limited impact on their attitudes. 33  Consequently, within the context of an 
election campaign more specifically, the high sophisticated can be expected to have a low probability 
of switching parties. The low sophisticated, by contrast, can be expected to be highly susceptible to 
change in a campaign period more specifically because this is when information on parties reaches 
them. 
 
Second, we can gain insights from the literature on the timing of the vote choice as well. Several 
authors have indicated that being highly interested in politics, being attentive to political information 
and high levels of political knowledge all lead to deciding earlier what party to vote for.34 As Schmitt-
Beck and Partheymüller conclude based on their reading of the literature: “… a lack of political 
involvement on the part of the voters impeded both their capacity and their motivation to arrive at a 
voting decision, leading to delayed choices”.35 Consequently, if voters change preferences, the least 
sophisticated are expected to do so during the campaign, while the high sophisticated –who are early-
deciding− are more likely to have done so before the campaign took off. High sophisticated voters, 
having decided early, are furthermore unlikely to subsequently change their minds. The low 
sophisticated voters, on the other hand, who cannot rely on well-developed political attitudes or strong 
dispositions are more likely to alter their choice before coming to a final decision on what party to 
vote for. Previous research on the time of the voting decision clearly leads to the expectations that the 
low sophisticated should have a high probability of changing parties during the election campaign. At 
the same time, given that the high sophisticated tend to decide early, if these voters switch parties, 
they should be doing this before the campaign period. 
 
For high sophisticated voters, the literature leads us to expect that the probability of switching parties 
is highest before the election campaign takes off and this merely by the fact that this group generally 
decides early. Additionally, in case parties have shifted ideologically since the previous election36, 
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only the high politically sophisticated can be thought to be aware and to change parties accordingly. 
This is so because gaps in political knowledge are generally higher outside of the information-rich 
contexts that election campaigns provide. 37  For low sophisticated voters, on the other hand, the 
probability of switching parties should be highest during the campaign. This expectation is driven both 
by the fact that this group tends to decide late and by the fact that the low sophisticated have been 
found to be more susceptible to campaign information. 
 
These expectations tie in with previous research that indicated that when investigating inter-election 
volatility and explicitly distinguishing this from changing during the campaign, high levels of political 
sophistication increase the probability of switching parties but that political sophistication decreases 
the likelihood of switching parties during an election campaign.38 This finding is expected to hold for 
the German political context as well, which leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Political sophistication increases the probability of inter-election volatility. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Political sophistication decreases the probability of campaign-volatility. 
 
The mechanisms underlying these hypotheses are one of susceptibility to change as the amount of 
information exposed to accumulates and one of the timing-of-voting-decision. Both mechanisms can 
be thought of to continue affecting the relation between political sophistication and volatility as 
Election Day draws near. If so, we should not merely think of a distinction between the campaign 
period and what comes before, but of a more or less continuous process by which the high 
sophisticated voters’ probability to switch parties decreases as the election draws near, while the low 
sophisticated voters’ probability should increase as one approaches election day. This then leads to 
expectation of an interaction between political sophistication and time, implying that as Election Day 
comes close, the effect of political sophistication on volatility becomes more negative. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The closer to Election Day, the stronger the negative effect of political 
sophistication on volatility. 
 
2.3. The German electoral context 
There has already been quite some scholarly attention for the evolution of party identification and the 
stability of party preferences in Germany. These studies provide indications of change over the past 
decades, with an erosion of the bonds between voters and political parties through a gradual process of 
dealignment.39 Furthermore there is already a long tradition of investigating electoral volatility as well 
within the German context.40 
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Investigating the link between political sophistication and volatility for the German electoral context 
implies that a number of specificities of this context have to be considered. More specifically, one can 
expect to find a substantial amount of switching among the high sophisticated. The main reason 
therefore is that strategic voting is promoted within the German electoral system and political culture, 
due to the presence of an electoral threshold and the formation of coalition governments. The openness 
of German parties about their preferred coalition partner and fear for the smaller parties to fall short of 
the electoral threshold convinces voters to refrain from their sincere vote for one of the larger parties 
and to support a small party instead. These preferred coalition partners are also ideologically close and 
one can distinguish between a conservative CDU/CSU-FDP-block on the one hand and a leftist SPD-
Green-block on the other hand. 41 Given that voters have to be aware of preferred coalitions and how 
close an election is, i.e. whether or not the small coalition partner is in need of votes, strategic voting 
requires some level of political sophistication. 42  Furthermore, as Lachat argues, the asymmetry 
between large and small parties within the ideological blocks of political parties, might explain why 
the high politically sophisticated are more likely to switch preferences within that block. Large 
political parties receive more media attention both in the course of the campaign and outside of the 
campaign period. As a consequence, the lower politically sophisticated are less likely to receive the 
messages of smaller parties, decreasing their probability of switching to the smaller party within 
‘their’ preferred block. 43  These specificities of the German system necessitate controlling for the 
presence of strategic considerations when investigating the link between political sophistication and 
volatility. Only if we find the expected link between political sophistication and volatility while 
controlling for these aspects, we can generalize our findings outside of the German context as well.  
 
Focusing on voting behaviour in Germany, one furthermore has to take into account the heterogeneity 
of East and West. Although unification dates from 1990 already, differences between voters in both 
parts of the country persist. As such, East-Germans are found to be party identifiers less often than 
their compatriots in the West.44 Missing the stabilizing impact of party identification, volatility can be 
expected to be higher among voters living in the East. On the other hand, vote switching caused by 
economic considerations is expected to be less pronounced in East-Germany. This is thought to be so 
because the reasoning making voters to reward or punish the incumbent at elections, is expected to be 
less strong in newer democracies.45 Clearly, differences between voters living in the East and voters 
from West Germany have to be taken into consideration in the analyses. 
 
2.4. Other determinants of volatility 
 
While the debate on the impact of political sophistication on volatility is an important one, and the 
focus of the current paper, other determinants as well have been investigated in the literature. Because 
he found theories on political sophistication having only a limited amount of explanatory power when 
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investigating volatility, Carsten Zelle proposed the ‘frustrated floating voter’ hypothesis. 46  Zelle’s 
main argument is that voters who switch parties are, very much like citizens abstaining from voting, 
dissatisfied. As such, volatility should not be considered a consequence of a lack of interest in politics 
but an expression of a mood of protest. Several scholars have more generally linked volatility to 
political disaffection and empirical results do point out that volatile voters tend to have lower levels of 
political trust and political efficacy and to be less satisfied with democracy.47 Even though this paper 
seeks to investigate the link between political sophistication and volatility, these concurrent theories 
cannot be neglected and should be controlled for in the analyses. 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
3.1.  Data 
The data used for the analyses presented in this paper are from the Short-term panel of the German 
Longitudinal Election Study.48 The data cover seven survey waves, conducted between 10 July 2009 
and 7 October 2009. The final wave was a post-electoral wave, for which field work started shortly 
after the elections that were held on 27 September 2009. 49 The data come from a non-probability 
online panel and active panellists who were eligible to vote were selected to participate. The selection 
of respondents was based on quota for gender, education and age groups. In the first wave 3,376 
respondents participated, of which 1,289 took part in all seven waves of the Short-term Campaign 
panel.  
 
The panel does not span several elections, but it does provide an extensive overview of dynamics 
within an election campaign. Furthermore, a recall question on voting in the previous election was 
included in the first wave of the survey. As such, with regard to the timing of vote switching, we can 
assess whether changes occurred before the campaign took off or within the campaign period.  Relying 
on a recall question of previous voting behaviour, it should be highlighted that this is an imperfect 
measure for investigating volatility. A number of mechanisms render recalled vote choices less 
reliable. First, citizens strive for consistency, resulting in reports of previous behaviour that are 
adjusted in the direction of current behaviour. 50  Second, voters can provide false reports simply 
because they are not able to remember previous behaviour. Third, the issue of social desirability leads 
voters who did not turn out to vote in elections to falsely report that they did. 51  Despite these 
shortcomings, given the lack of panel data covering multiple election cycles, relying on recall data is 
the “only way out” if one wants to investigate both inter-election and campaign volatility. 52 
Additionally, not for all types of volatility the explanatory power has been found to increase when 
using panel data instead of recalled behaviour.53  Comparing inter-election volatility, measured by 
means of a recall question and campaign volatility, measured via panel-data, we will have to keep in 
mind that the different measuring method can potentially affect the findings. The main question, 
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however, is whether the effect of political sophistication continues to change as the campaign unfolds 
and it is for this crucial campaign period that observed vote intentions can be relied on. 
 
The dependent variable in the analyses is vote switching, which takes the value 0 in case a respondent 
is stable and 1 when a respondent switches parties. A respondent can switch parties up to seven times, 
with the first possibility for switching being from the recalled vote choice of 2005 to the vote intention 
of wave 1. Subsequently a respondent can change vote intentions at every survey wave, up until wave 
7, where the 2009 vote choice is recalled (see Table 1).  Volatility is operationalized in a strict sense 
and refers to switching between parties only. As a consequence, respondents switching to or from a 
don’t know option are treated as missing. This strict operationalization is opted for in order not to 
confuse electoral volatility with uncertainty, undecidedness and deciding late what party to vote for.54 
As clear from Table 1, stability dominates and only 13% of the observations are switches between 
parties. Table 1 equally illustrates the issue of attrition throughout the panel, while information in 
wave 1 is still based on 1,418 respondents, in the final wave only 499 of them can still be included. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The main interest of this paper lies in investigating how political sophistication affects inter-election 
and campaign volatility. As a consequence, how political sophistication is operationalized is of crucial 
importance for the validity of the analyses. In the literature, different approaches have been taken to 
measure citizens’ level of political sophistication, which can be considered to stand for “the extent to 
which (…) political cognitions are numerous, cut a wide substantive swath, and are highly organized 
or ‘constrained’”.55 The consensus seems to be that political knowledge is the best single indicator for 
measuring sophistication, but other indicators such as political interest or political activity are also 
regularly looked at.56 The data used in this paper are from an online panel and consequently do not 
include measures of political knowledge. As an alternative, how Dalton operationalizes what he calls 
‘cognitive mobilization’ can be looked at; he relies on an additive index of levels of education and 
interest in politics. Dalton defends this index by stating that the two items “make an independent 
theoretical and empirical contribution to measuring cognitive mobilization”.57 Additionally, the two 
items seem to be correlating strongly with measures of political knowledge. Similarly, aiming to 
measure political sophistication, Lachat relies on a combination of measures of education and political 
interest when knowledge questions are not available.58 Following these examples, in this paper as well 
an additive index of levels of education and interest in politics is used as a proxy for the concept of 
political sophistication. Respondents’ level of education is measured on a scale from 0 to 459 and 
political interest is measured in five categories as well.60 Both of these items were summed, which 
results in an index of political sophistication running from 0 to 8. 
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In order to take into account the impact of political disaffection on volatility, measures of political 
trust, satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy are included. For political trust, the survey 
questioned respondents on their level of trust in a number of institutions, which could be rated on a 
scale from 1 (I do not trust at all) to 5 (I fully trust). Since measures for trust in the Bundestag, the 
federal government, parties and members of the German parliament strongly loaded on a one 
dimensional scale (Eigenvalue: 2.74, Explained variance: 68.51%), they were combined into a 1 to 5 
sumscale of political trust. Second, a measure of satisfaction with democracy is added, which comes 
from the single item included in the first wave asking respondents how satisfied they are with 
democracy in Germany. The response options for this item range from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very 
satisfied). Third, a measure of external political efficacy is included in the analyses. Therefore scores 
of respondents on two items included in the first wave of the survey were summed into a 1 to 5 
sumscale. The question wording of the items was the following: ‘Politicians care about what people 
like me think’ and ‘Citizens can hardly influence politics’ (reverse coding). Respondents could 
indicate to what degree they agree with the statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and both items loaded on a one-dimensional scale (Eigenvalue: 1.22, Explained 
variance: 61.15%). 
 
One of the arguments put forward in the literature for expecting highly sophisticated voters to be less 
likely to switch party preferences is that they are more likely to identify with a particular party. As a 
consequence, in order to avoid spurious effects when investigating the link between political 
sophistication and vote switching, partisanship is controlled for in the analyses.61 Furthermore, as was 
pointed out in the theory section, the German electoral system can be considered conducive for 
strategic voting. As a consequence, one can expect to find indications of a substantial degree of high 
sophisticated (within-block) volatility in the German context. To control for the effect of strategic 
considerations on volatility, a variable capturing likely strategic voters is included. Therefore, a 
dummy variable is included taking the value of 1 for a respondent identifying with one of the major 
parties (CDU/CSU or SPD) but having voted for one of their small preferred coalition partners (FDP 
or the Greens respectively) at the occasion of the previous election.62 
 
Additionally, some socio-demographical variables are included. Gender and age as well as the region 
where a respondent was born (distinguishing respondents born in the West, in the East and 
respondents born abroad/respondents without German citizenship) are added. Furthermore, religious 
denomination (distinguishing Catholic, other Christian denomination, other denomination and no 
denomination) and subjective class membership (Working class or lower middle class, middle class 
and upper middle class or upper class) are controlled for in the analyses. Descriptive statistics of all 
independent variables included in the analysis are listed in Table 2. 
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Because some key covariates in the analyses were only measured in the first wave of the survey, the 
dataset is necessarily limited to respondents who participated in at least the first two waves of the 
survey. Missing values therefore reduced the dataset to 6,636 observations nested in 1,418 individuals. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Making use of panel data does have some disadvantages of which we should be aware. First, panel 
attrition problems may cause the sample to be biased and this bias is likely to increase in subsequent 
panel waves. Furthermore, and this is an important caveat for the current analysis; higher educated and 
highly interested respondents have been found to be less sensitive to attrition than low educated or the 
low interested.63 Because of the multilevel modelling approach, however, information available on all 
respondents taking part in the first two waves is included in the analyses, regardless of whether these 
respondents take part in the full panel study. Therefore, although panel attrition effects should not be 
discarded, the method chosen reduces these distortions to some extent. Second, panel conditioning 
might be an issue, in which more stability is reported exactly because panel respondents are asked 
repeatedly about their vote intentions. 64  Clearly, the reliance on online panel data and attrition 
problems limit the generalizability of the findings presented in this manuscript. 
 
3.2. Method 
For testing the first two hypotheses, time is not a crucial variable, which is why regular logistic 
regression analyses can be employed. The dependent variable for investigating the first hypothesis is 
inter-election switching, which takes the value of 1 if a respondent switched preferences from the 
recalled 2005 vote to the wave 1 vote intention for the upcoming 2009 elections and 0 if a respondent 
reports to remain loyal to his or her 2005 vote choice. For testing the second hypothesis, campaign 
volatility is looked at. Therefore, the dependent variable included in the analyses takes the value of 1 if 
a respondent switched parties at least once during the campaign and the value of 0 otherwise. 
 
Additionally, this paper seeks to investigate the timing of vote switching, with specific attention for 
time-differences depending on levels of political sophistication. This aim renders event history 
analysis the appropriate methodological tool to investigate the third hypothesis, for which timing is 
crucial.65 Although the technique of event history analysis lends itself to investigate panel data and 
despite being frequently used in the field of sociology, only few studies employ event history analysis 
for investigating voting behaviour.66 
 
For testing the third hypothesis, as a first step, the data is converted into a person-period file, with for 
each individual as many records as survey waves participated to. What is then modelled is the time a 
respondent is at risk  of an event (i.e. switching parties) to occur. A respondent is at risk of the event to 
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occur until he or she switches parties or does not take part in the survey anymore, which is labelled 
‘censoring’. Given that throughout the panel survey, respondents could switch multiple times, a 
repeated events model is needed. Repeated events can be modelled in different ways, for the current 
analysis, a ‘total time’ approach is preferred, which implies that for each event, the time since the 
previous election is modelled.67 Steele has convincingly argued that recurrent events can be included 
in a straightforward way in a two-level hierarchical framework, with risk episodes nested in 
individuals. Following Steele’s approach, the models presented are multilevel models for longitudinal 
data. 68 Obviously, for a single individual, durations until vote switching are probably correlated. To 
take this possibility into account, the model controls for the number of previous switches within the 
panel.69   Respondents can switch vote intentions at any time before or during the campaign, but 
changes could only be measured when a survey wave was organized. As a consequence, discrete time 
hazard models are called for.70  
 
4. Results 
As a first step, we investigate the link between political sophistication and volatility for inter-election 
and campaign volatility separately. Previous research has indicated that when strictly separating both 
types of volatility, and distinguishing between switching parties before an election campaign starts off 
and switching during the election campaign, the effect of political sophistication is in opposite 
directions.71 
 
Table 3 presents the results of logistic regressions, in which inter-election and campaign volatility are 
analysed separately. Inter-election volatility is operationalized as reporting a vote intention in the first 
wave of the survey that differs from the recalled vote choice in 2005. All subsequent switches are 
operationalized as campaign switching. Given that campaign switching is possible at different 
instances, a respondent who switched at least once during the campaign is operationalized as a 
‘campaign switcher’. 
 
Because a number of scholars argue that the effect of political sophistication on both inter-election and 
campaign volatility is curvilinear, we also model a non-linear relation by additionally including the 
squared effect of the political sophistication index (Model 2 and Model 4). 
 
In Model 1 the correlates of inter-election volatility, strictly defined as switching before the campaign, 
are investigated. Looking at the effect of political sophistication first, only including the main effect of 
the political sophistication index indicates a significant and positive effect. As previous research 
already indicated, and as hypothesized (Hypothesis 1), higher levels of political sophistication increase 
the probability of changing parties from one election to the next election campaign.   
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The results for Model 1 furthermore indicate that Zelle’s claim that political disaffection should be 
looked at if one wants to understand the causes for vote switching is warranted.72 Higher levels of 
satisfaction with democracy significantly and strongly decrease the probability of inter-election 
switching and voters with higher levels of political trust as well are less likely to change parties. The 
results presented in Table 3 additionally indicate that none of the socio-demographic control variables 
seems to significantly affect voters’ probability of inter-election switching. Interestingly, although it is 
often claimed that East and West are still highly divergent political systems, the probability of inter-
election switching does not differ significantly in both parts of the country. The effect of party 
identification is significant and indicates that respondents who feel close to a party are clearly less 
likely to switch parties from one election to the next campaign. The strength of the effect accentuates 
the need to control for partisanship when investigating what causes voters to switch parties. An 
additional specificity of the German electoral context is the presence of incentives for strategic voting. 
The effect of strategic voting in 2005 indicates that this group of voters is significantly more likely to 
have changed parties by the start of the 2009 campaign. 
 
Model 2 includes all the independent variables from Model 1 and additionally the squared term of the 
political sophistication index, as such a curvilinear effect of political sophistication on inter-election 
switching is investigated. Doing so does not indicate a significant effect of political sophistication on 
inter-election volatility, which provides additional evidence that the effect of sophistication on inter-
election switching is linear. We can hence conclude that the results suggest that we can confirm our 
first hypothesis; higher levels of political sophistication significantly increase the probability of inter-
election volatility.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 3, using the same set of independent variables, it is investigated what 
factors are related to campaign volatility. Given that campaign volatility was possible at several 
instances during the campaign, as measured in different waves, the dependent variable measures 
whether a respondent has switched parties at least once during the campaign. As clear from the results, 
neither modelled linearly nor modelled curvilinearly, is the political sophistication index significantly 
related to campaign volatility. As a consequence, the results do not allow accepting the second 
hypothesis. 
 
Unlike what holds for inter-election volatility, attitudes of political disaffection do not seem to be 
affecting campaign volatility. As was the case for inter-election volatility as well, the socio-
demographical variables do not predict campaign volatility. In line with what was found for inter-
election volatility, then, it is clear that being close to a party significantly decreases the probability of 
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switching, while being a strategic voter significantly increases voters’ probability of switching. Given 
that only two independent variables are significant predictors of campaign volatility, the explanatory 
power of Model 3 and Model 4 is very low. 
 
The previous analyses indicated some crucial differences between inter-election volatility on the one 
hand and campaign volatility on the other. In the framework of the current paper, the results most 
importantly indicated that political sophistication increases the probability of switching parties from 
one election to the start of the next election campaign. Unlike what was hypothesized, political 
sophistication is not found to decrease the likelihood of changing parties along the election campaign. 
The next question then is whether differences in the effect (or absence of an effect) of political 
sophistication can be explained merely by the fact that a campaign period is inherently different from a 
non-campaign period, or whether −as stated in the third hypothesis− the effect of political 
sophistication becomes increasingly more negative as Election Day draws near? In order to test this, 
the timing of party switching is analysed by means of event history modelling techniques.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of three models. Model 1 is the main model of the pooled data including 
both switching before and during the campaign. In this model volatility is analysed by means of a 
random intercept multilevel model, with observations nested in individuals. The timing of switching is 
investigated through the inclusion of dummy variables for subsequent waves of the panel survey. In 
Model 2 additionally a random slope of the effect of time and an interactive term between 
sophistication and the campaign period is added. In Model 3, then, political sophistication is interacted 
with each of the wave dummies, which allows investigating whether the effect of political 
sophistication becomes more negative as the campaign unfolds. The independent variables included in 
the pooled models are the same as for the separate analyses of inter-election and campaign volatility. 
Additionally, because of the repeated-events-framework, the number of times a respondent has 
switched before is controlled for. 
 
Looking at the results for Model 1 first, the negative and significant coefficients for the survey wave 
dummies indicate that in all survey waves during the campaign, voters are less likely to change parties 
than they are before the campaign period. Additionally, the size of the coefficients somewhat increases 
for subsequent waves, indicating that the probability to switch decreases as Election Day draws near. 
This finding is indicative for the fact that as the election approaches, more and more voters have 
decided what party to vote for, rendering their vote intention more stable. 
 
The results of Model 1 presented in Table 4 furthermore indicate that when pooling inter-election and 
campaign volatility, the effect of political sophistication is no longer significant.  The variables 
capturing political disaffection do indicate significant effects, as clear from the significant and 
 16 
negative effects of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. Additionally, in line with the 
analyses for campaign volatility and inter-election volatility separately, being close to a party 
decreases the probability of switching while being a strategic voter increases the probability of 
switching. Given that repeated events are analysed, the number of times a respondent has switched 
parties by the time of the survey is controlled for. As clear from Model 1 in Table 4, however, this 
does not significantly affect the probability of changing parties. For the pooled analysis there are some 
indications of an effect of socio-demographics. Women seem to be somewhat more likely to change 
parties compared to men and respondents from the upper middle or upper classes are significantly less 
likely to switch parties than the middle classes. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Model 2 includes the same independent variables as Model 1 and additionally an interaction term 
between political sophistication and the campaign period. As can be seen from Table 4, most results 
are robust to the inclusion of this interaction term. Surprisingly, the effect of the number of times 
switched before is negative and significant, which is indicative for a ceiling effect. Having switched 
parties in the course of the campaign does not provoke more switching, but on the contrary obstructs 
further volatility. For political sophistication, then, it can be observed that the main effect of the 
political sophistication index is positive and becomes marginally significant. The interaction term, 
with a coefficient of about equal size, is negative and significant. As such, these results indicate that 
the effect of political sophistication on volatility is positive before the campaign, but this positive 
effect is countered and becomes negligible during the campaign period, which is in line with the 
findings in Table 3. 
 
Both the results for separate analyses of inter-election volatility and campaign volatility and the results 
of the pooled approach seem to confirm that the effect of political sophistication differs for campaign 
and non-campaign periods. As such, there is suggestive evidence for what previous research has 
already indicated; political sophistication increases the probability of switching before an election 
campaign but this effect is reversed in campaign periods. The next step, then, is to investigate whether 
this difference between the campaign and the non-campaign period is the reflection of a continuous 
process of change in the run up to the elections or merely a contrast between the campaign and the 
non-campaign period. Therefore, in Model 3 the political sophistication index is interacted with each 
of the wave dummies. If the process were one of increasingly more negative effects of political 
sophistication on the probability of switching, we would observe significant negative effects for these 
interaction terms and an increase of the sizes of coefficients as Election Day draws near. 
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The results of Model 3 are in line with this expectation, even though not all interactive terms are 
significant, the trend is clearly one of increasingly more negative effects of political sophistication on 
the probability of switching parties. Furthermore, looking at the main effect of political sophistication 
in Model 3, curvilinearity is hinted at. As a result, the main effect of sophistication on volatility found 
is in line with what previous research has already indicated. But the results point to an important 
addition in terms of timing. As Election Day draws near, the effect of political sophistication becomes 
more negative and the constraining effect of sophistication on switching is enhanced. As a 
consequence, we find suggestive evidence for the third hypothesis. The differences in the effect of 
political sophistication on volatility in non-campaign periods and campaign periods seem to be a 
reflection of a continuous process by which the effect of political sophistication changes. Higher levels 
of political sophistication significantly increase the probability of switching before the campaign, but 
this ‘advantage’ diminishes as Election Day draws near. In the final wave, then, the effect is reversed 
and higher levels of political sophistication are associated with a lower probability of switching 
parties. As a consequence, the aspect of timing is crucial to take into account when scholars 
investigate the link between sophistication and electoral volatility. 
 
To have a better grasp of what the size of the estimated effects of political sophistication and its 
interaction with time are, we present the results of some predicted probabilities in Figure 1. 
Predictions are made for two extreme cases; a respondent with a minimum level of political 
sophistication and a respondent with a maximum level of political sophistication. Most importantly, 
the graph illustrates that the high sophisticates are strongly more likely to switch parties before the 
campaign takes off (see the difference in probabilities in Wave 1).  In the course of the campaign 
period, then, the probability that a high sophisticated voter switches parties is in continuous decline. 
For the low sophisticates, by contrast, the probability to switch parties increases as Election Day draws 
near. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As an additional robustness test, interactions of other independent variables and time were included as 
well. These tests indicated that results for political sophistication are robust to taking into account that 
the effects of political trust, external efficacy or satisfaction with democracy on volatility as well can 
vary over time.73 
 
5. Conclusion 
What effect political sophistication has on volatility is an old question in the field of political research. 
It is additionally a highly relevant question, because the voters who switch parties from one election to 
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another hold the balance of power. Nevertheless, the debate on whether political sophistication 
increases or decreases the probability to switch parties is still on-going. 
 
In this article, this classical puzzle within research on voting behaviour is investigated with specific 
attention for the element of timing. Building on previous research, the starting point is that the effect 
of political sophistication on volatility differs depending on whether inter-election or campaign 
volatility is looked at. For the German 2009 elections, the results do indeed suggest that political 
sophistication somewhat increased the probability to switch parties before the campaign took off. 
Along the campaign period covered by the German Short-term campaign panel, however, political 
sophistication does not significantly affect the likelihood that voters switch parties. 
 
A number of reasons can be thought of why high levels of sophistication increase the probability of 
switching before the campaign but not in the campaign period. First, it is known that high politically 
sophisticated voters decide earlier what party to vote for. If these voters decide to switch parties from 
one election to another, therefore, they can be expected to be doing so early on. Second, high levels of 
sophistication arm voters against the influence of political messages during the campaign. Both of 
these factors, then, can be thought of to become increasingly important as Election Day comes near 
and the campaign unfolds. Therefore, the analysis is taken a step further and a continuous process of a 
changing impact of political sophistication on volatility is investigated.  
 
The results of the multilevel analyses do indeed suggest that the effect of political sophistication on 
volatility continues to change as Election Day draws near. This finding is not inconsequential for 
political science research; it implies that when voters are interviewed on their vote choice and vote 
intentions affects the relation found between political sophistication and volatility. The differences 
between inter-election and campaign volatility that have previously been found therefore are not a 
mere consequence of the different setting. Processes are at work that continue to alter the effect of 
sophistication on volatility up until Election Day. 
 
This study obviously suffers from some important limitations, the impact of which warrant further 
investigation. First, the data are based on analyses on a non-probability on-line panel sample. This 
aspect can obviously bias findings, especially when it comes to investigating the effect of political 
sophistication on volatility. Furthermore, the repeated survey-design introduces an attrition bias, 
leading to an enhanced focus on a small group of most likely high politically sophisticated 
respondents. As a consequence, the results should be interpreted with some caution and a 
straightforward generalization towards the electorate at large is not possible. Future research, 
therefore, should provide insights on whether the same patterns can be observed when analysing 
volatility among a representative probability sample. Second, the presence of a substantial amount of 
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strategic voting could be argued to warrant investigating differences between within- and between-
block switching or to take into account the ideological distance bridged.74 The relatively small number 
of volatile respondents in the sample, however, and the differentiation of the effect in panel waves, 
render the results of such an analysis highly unstable. Third, although the survey used included a recall 
question on voting behaviour in the previous election, ideally the contrasting effects of sophistication 
for inter-election and campaign volatility respectively are investigated by means of a full panel 
covering different election campaigns. The fact that the process of change observed continues 
throughout the campaign period and therefore for observed changes as well, however, increases the 
reliability of the findings. Nevertheless, investigating the impact of timing on the relation between 
political sophistication and volatility by means of a full panel is the next step to take. 
 
The results of the current analysis indicate that timing matters when investigating volatility. When one 
measures vote intention switching is likely to affect the relation found between political sophistication 
and volatility. Given the importance of the debate on the effect of political sophistication in research 
on volatility, this finding should not be disregarded. Future research therefore should bear in mind that 
the timing of measuring change does affect the results. 
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Table 1. Dependent variable measurement 
 N stable N volatile Total N 
estimation sample 
Recall vote choice 2005 (w1) – Vote 
intention (w1) 
1,047 371 1,418 
Vote intention (w1) – Vote intention (w2) 1,192 152 1,344 
Vote intention (w2) – Vote intention (w3) 982 103 1,085 
Vote intention (w3) – Vote intention (w4) 838 80 918 
Vote intention (w4) – Vote intention (w5) 710 74 784 
Vote intention (w5) – Vote intention (w6) 526 62 588 
Vote intention (w6) – vote choice 2009 
(w7) 
452 47 499 
Total 5,747 889 6,636 
Source: GLES 2009. Short-term Campaign Panel ZA5305, version 3.0.0. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Female 6,636 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Age 6,636 45.57 13.72 18 80 
West German 6,636 0.79 0.41 0 1 
East German 6,636 0.19 0.39 0 1 
No German/Abroad 6,636 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Working or lower middle class 6,636 0.35 0.50 0 1 
Middle class 6,636 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Upper middle or upper class 6,636 0.11 0.32 0 1 
No denomination 6,636 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Catholic 6,636 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Other Christian denomination 6,636 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Other denomination 6,636 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Political sophistication index 6,636 5.10 1.51 1 8 
Satisfaction with democracy 6,636 3.35 0.89 1 5 
External efficacy 6,636 2.73 1.00 1 5 
Political trust 6,636 2.81 0.69 1 5 
Party identification 6,636 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Times switched before 6,636 0.35 0.67 0 5 
Strategic voter 6,636 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Source: GLES 2009. Short-term Campaign Panel ZA5305, version 3.0.0. 
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Table 3: Explaining Inter-election and campaign volatility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Inter-election volatility Inter-election volatility Campaign volatility Campaign volatility 
 Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Female -0.110 (0.128) -0.108 (0.128) 0.141 (0.098) 0.142 (0.098) 
Age -0.001 (0.005) -0.000 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Region born (ref: West)         
East -0.234 (0.175) -0.234 (0.175) -0.016 (0.132) -0.016 (0.132) 
Abroad/no German citizenship -0.003 (0.439) -0.001 (0.439) 0.368 (0.299) 0.365 (0.299) 
Subjective class membership (ref: 
Middle class) 
        
Working or lower middle class -0.030 (0.143) -0.023 (0.143) 0.086 (0.109) 0.089 (0.109) 
Upper middle class or upper class -0.207 (0.211) -0.196 (0.211) -0.118 (0.165) -0.115 (0.165) 
Religious denomination (ref: no 
denomination) 
        
Catholic 0.028 (0.165) 0.037 (0.165) 0.038 (0.128) 0.042 (0.128) 
Other Christian -0.049 (0.156) -0.039 (0.156) -0.084 (0.121) -0.080 (0.121) 
Other -0.417 (0.525) -0.419 (0.525) -0.356 (0.341) -0.353 (0.341) 
Political sophistication index 0.099* (0.044) 0.392 (0.257) 0.050 (0.034) 0.146 (0.181) 
Political sophistication index2   -0.029 (0.025)   -0.010 (0.018) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.226** (0.079) -0.226** (0.079) -0.040 (0.060) -0.040 (0.060) 
External efficacy -0.012 (0.065) -0.011 (0.065) -0.029 (0.051) -0.029 (0.051) 
Political trust -0.220* (0.100) -0.225* (0.100) -0.108 (0.078) -0.108 (0.078) 
Party ID -1.022*** (0.194) -1.027*** (0.194) -0.335* (0.139) -0.335* (0.139) 
Strategic voter 1.203*** (0.244) 1.198*** (0.244) 1.226*** (0.236) 1.223*** (0.236) 
Constant 0.845° (0.478) 0.153 (0.765) -0.185 (0.354) -0.408 (0.542) 
         
N 1,418 1,418 1,896 1,896 
Log likelihood -774.693 -774.004 -1,233.218 -1,233.097 
Pseudo-R2 0.050 0.050 0.018 0.019 
Source: GLES 2009. Short-term Campaign Panel ZA5305, version 3.0.0. Significance levels: ° p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 4: The timing of switching 
Source: GLES 2009. Short-term Campaign Panel ZA5305, version 3.0.0. Significance levels: ° p < 
0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Survey wave (ref: wave 1)       
Wave 2 -1.375*** (0.124) -0.307 (0.547) -0.152 (0.551) 
Wave 3 -1.617*** (0.147) -0.795° (0.592) -1.110 (0.758) 
Wave 4 -1.705*** (0.159) -1.337* (0.648) -0.843 (0.902) 
Wave 5 -1.627*** (0.179) -1.715** (0.715) -1.734° (1.141) 
Wave 6 -1.453*** (0.202) -1.989** (0.800) -1.430 (1.249) 
Wave 7 -1.642*** (0.232) -2.720*** (0.890) -1.002 (1.589) 
Female 0.201° (0.126) 0.046 (0.225) 0.080 (0.205) 
Age -0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008) 
Region born (ref: West)       
East 0.212 (0.165) -0.062 (0.297) -0.026 (0.286) 
Abroad/no German 
citizenship 
-0.085 (0.426) -0.151 (0.754) -0.189 (0.791) 
Subjective class membership 
(ref: Middle class) 
      
Working or lower middle 
class 
0.030 (0.143) -0.067 (0.257) -0.102 (0.241) 
Upper middle class or 
upper class 
-0.339* (0.193) -0.563° (0.389) -0.519° (0.358) 
Religious denomination (ref: 
no denomination) 
      
Catholic 0.156 (0.166) 0.226 (0.300) 0.217 (0.285) 
Other Christian 0.012 (0.152) 0.041 (0.277) 0.042 (0.274) 
Other -0.398 (0.516) -0.822 (0.909) -0.858 (0.908) 
Political sophistication index -0.161 (0.150) 0.259° (0.204) 0.405*** (0.121) 
Political sophistication index2 0.019 (0.015) -0.006 (0.017) -0.022° (0.015) 
Political 
sophistication*Campaign 
period 
  -0.200* (0.099)   
Political sophistication*w2     -0.231*** (0.105) 
Political sophistication*w3     -0.144 (0.146) 
Political sophistication*w4     -0.303* (0.174) 
Political sophistication*w5     -0.211 (0.232) 
Political sophistication*w6     -0.324° (0.245) 
Political sophistication*w7     -0.546* (0.317) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.147* (0.075) -0.273* (0.137) -0.327* (0.134) 
External efficacy -0.060 (0.068) -0.046 (0.125) -0.045 (0.098) 
Political trust -0.226* (0.092) -0.478*** (0.135) -0.359* (0.171) 
Party ID -0.868*** (0.190) -1.881*** (0.340) -1.617*** (0.308) 
Times switched before 0.098 (0.128) -2.041*** (0.405) -1.853*** (0.390) 
Strategic voter 1.163*** (0.255) 2.387*** (0.485) 2.158*** (0.457) 
Constant 0.797 (0.602) 0.572 (1.042) 0.037 (0.630) 
σ2 constant 1.961 (0.415) 8.730 (2.082) 7.795 (2.230) 
σ2 time   1.273 (0.381) 1.196 (0.359) 
Nobservations 6,636 6,636 6,636 
Nindividuals 1,418 1,418 1,418 
Bayesian DIC 4,450.20 3,489.02 3,565.14 
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of switching parties over time – comparing low and high 
sophisticates 
 
Predictions based on estimations in Model 3 of Table 4. Predict ions for female respondents of midd le social 
class and with an other than Catholic christian denomination, not identifying with a party and are not voting 
strategically. A ll other variables set at their mean. Source: GLES 2009. Short-term Campaign Panel 
ZA5305, version 3.0.0. 
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